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Abstract
In this article, a general analysis is made of the pros and cons of
accepting no-fault liability claims against the European Union, against the background
of the FIAMM decision. The acceptance of a no fault liability regime cannot be ruled
out from a comparative law perspective, although national case law does not show
many examples of a breach of the principle of ‘égalité devant les charges publiques’
in the field of economic law. Furthermore, the author claims that the development of
this type of liability is strongly dependent on judicial policy considerations. As law
currently stands, the development of this type of liability is most likely to take place
through special legislation which has been brought about by the EU institutions.
1 Introduction
Practitioners of EU law are used to focussing on the way EU
law influences the judicial protection in the Member States. Generally, less at-
tention is paid to the way national systems of judicial protection might influence
the case law of the Court of Justice. The action for damages enshrined in article
340(2) of the TFEU is an example of how this second type of influence can take
place. This article allows a party to bring a case before the European Union
Courts, in order to obtain compensation for damage resulting from actions of
one of the institutions. This type of liability does not directly influence the na-
tional regime of compensation for damages. The influence is even exerted the
other way around, since the Court of Justice has to base the liability regime of
the European Union ‘in accordance with the general principles common to the
laws of the Member States’. In practice, this means that the applicant must
show the existence of a wrongful act, actual damage and a causal link. There is
no question that liability for wrongful acts is ‘common’ to the laws of the
Member States.
The question of whether EU law should also accept a regime whereby liabil-
ity exists in the absence of a fault, has been significantly more controversial. The
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Court of Justice has, for a long time, hinted at the existence of such a type of
liability. This would mean that the institutions can be forced to pay compensa-
tion when an, in itself legal, act leads to ‘special’ and ‘abnormal’ damage. These
conditions can be traced back to the principle of ‘equality before the public
burdens’, which will be discussed in more detail later on. Although art. 340
TFEU does not explicitly rule out the possibility that the Union can be held liable
in the absence of a wrongful act, in the FIAMM decision of 9th of September
2008, the Court brought all speculation concerning the existence of a separate
regime concerning no-fault liability of the European Union to an end. The Court
of Justice ruled that ‘[a]s Community law currently stands, no liability regime
exists under which the Community can incur liability for conduct falling within
the sphere of its legislative competence in a situation where any failure of such
conduct to comply with the WTO agreements cannot be relied upon before the
Community courts.’1
This decision was met with fierce criticism. Authors have mainly been crit-
ical about the outcome of this case for the applicants in the FIAMM case. In
this article, a more general analysis is made of the pros and cons of accepting
no-fault liability claims against the European Union. This analysis is made
against the background of the FIAMM decision, since this decision offers a
good insight as to why the Court of Justice currently refuses to recognise the
possibility of such a regime. For this purpose, I will first give a brief outline of
the facts concerning the FIAMM case, the decision of the Court of First Instance
and the Court of Justice (section 2). Section 3 will deal with the meaning of the
principle known as égalité devant les charges publiques (‘equality before public
burdens’, or, in other words, the equality of citizens in bearing public burdens)
– the most important basis for compensation for damages – in a general sense,
partly on the basis of Dutch and French case law. Next, I will deal with its po-
tential added value to EU law. To this end, I will first examine whether, from
a comparative law perspective, the principle of equality before public burdens
(hereinafter called the ‘principle of equality’) may be meaningful at the level of
the European Union (section 4). After some legal policy observations in section
5, section 6 focuses on the options for compensation for damages left at the
level of the EU after the FIAMM judgment.
2 Case Law of the Courts Regarding No-Fault Liability
Up until the FIAMM decision, neither the Court of First In-
stance nor the Court of Justice had ever explicitly ruled out the possibility of
C-120/06P and C-121/06P Fabbrica italiana motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) a.o. v. Council
and Commission [2008] ECR I-6513.
1
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claimants putting forward a successful claim in damages despite the damaging
act being lawful. However, both Courts have also never explicitly recognised
that art. 340 TFEU (formerly art. 288 EU Treaty) implies such a possibility.
Instead, for a long time both Courts opted for a conditional approach. This ap-
proach is illustrated by the Dorsch Consult case. In this case, a German firm of
consultant engineers had been contracted to perform services for the Ministry
of Housing in Iraq. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations
Security Council imposed an embargo on trade with Iraq and Kuwait, preventing
trade by the Union with Iraq and Kuwait. The Iraqi government reacted by
freezing all property and assets, which it owed to the states that adopted the
embargo. This was harmful to Dorsch Consult, a company that still held out-
standing debts with the Iraqi government, which it now could not retrieve.
Dorsch Consult claimed compensation from the Union, reasoning that as a
result of the trade embargo, it had foregone large sums of money that were still
owed to it. The Court of Justice, following in the steps of the Court of First In-
stance, took the opportunity to stipulate which conditions such a claim in any
case had to meet. The Court stated that:
‘If the Community is to incur non-contractual liability as the result of a lawful
or unlawful act, it is necessary in any event to prove that the alleged damage is
real and that a causal link exists between that act and the alleged damage.
Secondly, with respect to the Community’s liability in respect of a lawful act,
the Court noted that it was clear from the relevant case-law that, in the event
of such a principle being recognised as forming part of Community law, a
precondition for such liability would in any event be the existence of “unusual”
and “special” damage.’2
The Court went on to state that Dorsch Consult did not meet the ‘unusual’ re-
quirement, since Iraq had to be regarded, even before the invasion of Kuwait,
as a ‘high-risk country’. The damage alleged by the appellant could not therefore
be regarded as exceeding the economic risks inherent in operating in the eco-
nomic sector concerned.
This approach, in which the Court even went so far as to test whether the
conditions for no-fault liability were adhered to, but refused to answer the pre-
ceding question whether this type of liability is actually accepted, was met with
criticism. For example, Tridimas stated that this approach is not satisfactory,
since it puts the cart before the horse and is liable to maintain uncertainty.3
From this perspective, the decision in the FIAMM case was very welcome,
Case C-237/98 Dorsch Consult v. Council and Commission [2000] ECR I-4549; [2002] 1 CMLR
41.
2
T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford 2006), p. 495.3
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ending all speculation although maybe not offering all certainty that some
commentators might have wished for. The FIAMM case was comparable to the
Dorsch Consult case since the damage was also the direct result of a state taking
retaliation measures. In this case however, these measures were a reaction by
the United States to Council Regulations found to be incompatible with WTO
agreements. The United States decided to increase the customs duty that FIAMM
(and some other companies) had to pay when exporting their products to the
United States, irrespective of the fact that FIAMM had nothing to do with these
breaches, which took place in the banana industry. The Court of First Instance
affirmed the standing jurisprudence that even though the Dispute Settlement
Body had held that the Community Legislation was incompatible with the WTO
agreements, this could not give rise to liability on the part of the Community
on account of unlawful conduct by its institutions, since the WTO agreements
are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Community courts
review the legality of action by the Community institutions. According to the
Court of First Instance, this limitation did not stand in the way of the possibil-
ity of FIAMM to claim damages in absence of unlawful conduct. For the first
time, the Court of First Instance recognised that there was such a possibility,
which could require the Community to make good the damage suffered by
operators who have to bear a disproportionate share of the burden resulting
from such conduct. The Court of First Instance nevertheless concluded that in
this case the conditions governing such liability were not satisfied because, in
the light of the normal hazards of international trade, the damage suffered by
the applicants was not unusual in nature.
The Court of Justice however, stated that the Court of First Instance erred
in law by affirming the existence of a regime providing for the non-contractual
no-fault liability of the Community. In this regard, it put forward two main ar-
guments. First, it stated that although the principle of Community liability
where one of the institutions has acted unlawfully is an expression of a general
principle familiar to the legal systems of all the Member States, by contrast no
such convergence of the Member States’ legal systems has been established
regarding the existence of a principle of liability in the case of a lawful act by a
public authority, in particular where that act is of a legislative nature. Secondly,
the Court pointed out that the legislative context is characterised by the exercise
of a wide discretion, which is essential for implementing a Community policy.
Therefore, the EC cannot incur liability unless the institution concerned has
manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers.
The FIAMM decision has left many commentators wondering why the Court
came to such a ‘harsh’ decision.4 They have also pointed out that both arguments
See, f.e., Coutron, ‘Responsabilité pour faute et responsabilité sans faute en droit commun-
autaire. Les approximations de l’arrêt FIAMM. Note sous CJCE 8 septembre 2008, FIAMM,
4
aff. jointes no. C-120/06 et C-121/06’ [2009] Revue française de droit administratif 329, 340-341
and G.A. Zonnekeyn, ‘De “onschuldige” exporteurs in de kou: geen schadevergoeding voor
schending van WTO-recht’ [2008] NTER 363-370.
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mentioned by the Court are not convincing. Before dealing in more detail witht
this matter, I will first reflect in a more general way on the equality principle.
3 General Observations on No-Fault State Liability
3.1 Introduction
In order to analyse whether any added value can be expected
from the recognition a no-fault liability regime by the European Courts, it is
useful to offer a more general overview of this type of liability. Which principle(s)
underpin(s) this type of liability? Which conditions does a successful claim have
to fulfil and how are these conditions generally interpreted? Last but not least,
to what situations does this type of liability apply?
Where there is, generally speaking, communis opinio on the question of
whether and on which conditions authorities can be held liable when acting
unlawfully, for a long time there was no such clarity when dealing with no-fault
liability. This was also pointed out by the Court of First Instance, which accepted
a regime of no-fault liability, despite the fact that ‘national laws on non-contrac-
tual liability allow individuals, albeit to varying degrees, in specific fields and
in accordance with differing rules, to obtain compensation in legal proceedings
for certain kinds of damage, even in the absence of unlawful action by the per-
petrator of the damage.’5 This did not, however, stop the CFI from bringing
this type of liability within the scope of art. 340 TFEU (then art. 288 EU-treaty).
The Court of Justice took a somewhat less obliging view when stating that there
is in ‘no way’ convergence of legal systems in the establishment of a principle
of liability in the case of a lawful act or omission of the public authorities, in
particular where it is of a legislative nature. There is something to be said for
both views, although the question remains whether a lack of coherence on the
national level should have repercussions on the level of the EU, as will be argued
later on in this article. For this moment, it should be pointed out that, indeed,
not a lot is clear on the ratio, meaning and scope of government liability in ab-
sence of fault.
This does not mean, however, that we should leave it at this. In fact, when
looking at the way no-fault liability has developed in some Member States, it is
quite possible to gain a better grip on this type of liability and its conditions.
Especially the state liability regimes of France and Germany are apt for a further
study on the meaning and scope of no-fault liability. In Germany, the adminis-
trative judges have developed the concept of the Sonderopfer, which allows for
civilians and companies to claim damages from the government when their
Case T-69/00 FIAMM v. Commission and Council [2005] ECR II-5393.5
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property rights are infringed (‘opfer’) in an exceptional way (‘sonder’) by an act
in the general interest. A similar concept has been developed at the beginning
of the 20th century – to be more precise: the Couitéas-decision of 1923 was the
starting point – by the French Council of State (Conseil d’Etat). Like its German
counterpart, the principle of equality before the public burdens allows only for
exceptional damages to be compensated. The damage has to be both ‘special’
and ‘abnormal’ in order to obtain compensation.
Both principles have been referred to by parties in cases before the European
Courts; the same goes for different advocate generals in their opinions.6 Here-
after, I will concentrate on the French case law, since this case law has also in-
fluenced the case law in other countries (such as the Netherlands, Luxembourg
and Belgium). Furthermore, most authors assume that in the context of EU
law, too, the most obvious solution would be to base any non-contractual no-
fault liability on the principle of equality.7 French law therefore seems to be an
apt starting point for a further elaboration on the characteristics of no-fault
government liability.
3.2 Origins of the Principle of Equality as the Legal Basis for
Liability
To put it briefly, the equality principle requires that excessive
burdens resulting from actions that public authorities undertake in the general
interest should not be borne by a limited group of citizens but by society as a
whole.8 The development of this doctrine can be traced back to the French Re-
volution and the ideas of equality rooted in it.9 The principle of equality in
French administrative law was developed exlusively by the French Council of
State (Conseil d’Etat) in its case law. As early as the beginning of the 20th century,
the Council of State realised that the French system of state liability would be
unbalanced if it merely provided for the possibility of holding public authorities
liable by reason of an unlawful act. Since there are some barriers to this type
See for a reference to the Sonderopfer-principle f.e. Joined Cases 54 to 60/76P Comté de Lohéac
v. Council and Commission [1977] ECR 645, para. 19), and the Opinion of AG Reischl (Jur. 1977,
6
p. 645 et seq., on p. 666). See for the equality principle Case 59/83 Biovilac v. Council
andCommission [1984] Jur. 1984, p. 4057, para. 28, Case 26/81 Oleifici Mediterranei v. Council
and Commission [1982] ECR 3057, paras 26-27) and the Opinion of AG Verloren van Themaat
in the last case (Jur. 1982, p 3089-3090). In his opinion on the FIAMM case (Case C-120 and
121/06), FIAMM a.o. va. Commission and Council [2008], para. 62-63, AG Maduro pointed at
both principles.
Van Casteren, Schadevergoeding voor rechtmatig EG-optreden (University of Nijmegen 1997),
and the previous footnote.
7
See also K.M. Scherr, ‘Public liability for administrative acts under French law’, European
Public Law 2008.
8
See in more detail S. Caporal, L’affirmation du principe d’égalité dans le droit public de la révolution
Française (1789-1799) (Paris 1995).
9
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of liability – particularly where administrative authorities have discretionary
power – a system of liability limited to unlawful acts could mean that many
victims of detrimental public acts would not have an opportunity to obtain any
relief. Hence, to a great extent, resorting to a form of objective state liability was
a compromise. By awarding compensation for abnormal damage or loss without
insisting that the public action had to be unlawful in some cases, the Council
of State allowed the government to come off unscathed. Furthermore, victims
of decisions taken by a public authority that exercised discretionary power or
of hazardously negligent administrative actions could be compensated.10 It is
generally assumed that considerations of equity in particular prompted this
development: if the court considered this fair, it resorted to one of the grounds
within the no-fault liability concept (responsabilité sans faute) to justify its decision
to award compensation.11 In this context, Harlow characterises the equality
principle as an ‘expression of social solidarity’.12
3.3 Significance and Scope of the Principle of Equality
Even in French legal literature, there is a lack of clarity on the
significance and scope of the principle of equality.13 For example, some authors
take the view that the principle of equality explains not only why the government
may be liable for lawful acts, but it even justifies the existence of state liability
as a whole.14 Whenever such damage or loss arises, whether the conduct con-
cerned involves any fault or not, this results in a ‘public burden’ (charge publique),
which imposes a heavier burden on the victim than on others and for that
reason, it requires the state to pay compensation. It should be noted that in
practice French administrative law does not follow this view. If the Council of
State holds the state liable for an unlawful act, it does not invoke the principle
of equality in doing so. The scope of application of this principle has been
confined to situations in which the state acts lawfully.
But even within that – extremely broad – field, the equality principle is not
always applicable. As is shown by the relevant case law, the application of the
principle of equality is reserved to specific kinds of acts: individual or general
P. Amselek, ‘La responsabilité sans faute des personnes publiques d’après la jurisprudence
administrative’, in: Recueil d’études en hommage à Charles Eisenmann (Paris 1977), p. 233-262,
10
at p. 257: ‘[E]n se référant, non pas au fondement de la faute, mais à celui du dommage anormal,
le juge parvient tout à la fois à sécourir la victime et à ménager la personne publique en cause’.
Amselek 1977, p. 256 qualificies this as ‘une jurisprudence d’inspiration charismatique’ en
‘une politique jurisprudentielle d’équité (…)’.
11
C. Harlow, ‘Rationalising administrative compensation’ [2010] Public Law, 334.12
See f.e. T. Debard, ‘L’égalité des citoyens devant les charges publiques: fondement incertain
de la responsabilité administrative’, Rec. Dalloz 1987, p. 157-163 and C. Harlow, ‘The current
state of state liability’ [2002/4] Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 915–33 (at 932).
13
See f.e. P. Duez, La responsabilité de la puissance publique (en dehors du contrat) (Paris 1938).14
13Review of European Administrative Law 2013-1
BETWEEN EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NO-FAULT LIABILITY
decisions of an administrative authority (décisions resp. règlements), factual action
(in the context of the construction of public works, for example) and acts whose
creation or approval requires parliamentary involvement, i.e. Acts of Parliament
and treaties. If the damage or loss arises from conduct that is lawful but hazard-
ous, the French Council of State applies the theory of risk as a legal basis. An
example is the case where a bystander was wounded by a bullet from a firearm
used by the police in the lawful execution of its tasks.15 If the question concerning
the significance and scope of the principle of equality is to be answered properly,
a more detailed look at French law is required.
The case law and the legal literature show that three key conditions are
crucially important to liability based on equality. Before dealing with these, it
should be noted that the principle of equality requires the damage or loss to be
caused by a public authority; accordingly, the principle cannot constitute a basis
for any damage or loss caused by external events, such as floods or natural
disasters or if a private person inflicts damage on another person. In addition,
the damage should be caused by an act; the case law shows that this concerns
most of the time a written decision, although it might also concern a non-legal
act, such as the lawful reconstruction of a road. It is difficult to conceive that
the refraining from action might lead to a successful appeal on the equality
principle.16 This might be different when a public authority decides to refrain
from action, but in such a case, the damage is strictly speaking inflicted by the
act itself.17
A The Damage Must Result from an Act Containing a Lawful Balancing of Interests
The presence of an act is not enough, however. In addition, the loss-causing
conduct must be lawful. This condition is usually considered equivalent to the
condition that the act must be performed ‘in the general interest.’18 When viewed
from the perspective of the French administrative courts and their case law,
this definition is not quite adequate. For example, in France the theory of risk
is also applied as a basis for liability, in which case a public authority may be
liable if activities undertaken by public authorities, even conducted without
CE 24 June 1949, Rec. 307 (Consorts Lecomte).15
In the same sense: Van Casteren, Schadevergoeding voor rechtmatig EG-optreden (Deventer 1997),
p. 240.
16
See for examples in the French jurisprudence where public authorities decide not to let the
police make an ending to the occupation of ports or pieces of land (see f.e. CE 30 november
1923, Rec. p. 789 (Couitéas) and CE 22 June 1984, D. 1986, p. 29 (Soc. Sealink).
17
As exemplified by the description of no-fault liability in Recommendation nr. R (84) 15 of the
committee of ministers tot member states relating to public liability: ‘(…) reparation should be
18
ensured if it is manifestly unjust to allow the injured person alone to bear the damage, having
regard to the following circumstances: the act is in the general interest, only one or a limited number
of persons have suffered the damage and the act was exceptional or the damage was an exceptional
result of the act.’
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fault, create an increased risk to society.19 Here too, it is safe to assume that
such activities are undertaken in the general interest – i.e. are lawful – but that
the principle of equality cannot be used as a basis for compensation. Accordingly,
for hazardously negligent acts, the administrative court uses the risk theory as
the basis for compensation.20
What then are the ‘characteristic features’ of the concept of equality before
public burdens? What do the acts, for which a claim based on equality can be
made in French administrative law, have in common exactly? Several authors
have pointed out that the principle of equality in this context assumes that the
act causing damage or loss includes a volitional component.21 The damage cannot
be a mere incidental consequence of the act, but is the inevitable consequence
of an act which leads to the result that some people’s interests are consciously
sacrificed in the general interest. In this context, Delvolvé states that there must
be an end-means relationship between the damage and serving the general in-
terest: the principle of equality applies if the result the government intended
to achieve with its lawful act can be attained only by inflicting damage on a cit-
izen.22 This damage should arise as a necessary or – somewhat broader – inev-
itable consequence of the lawful act.23
As a rule, the damage will therefore be the foreseeable consequence of the
act, while by contrast, the damage for which compensation may be granted
under the risk theory is nonrecurring and unpredictable in nature. This is not
the case under the principle of equality. Under this principle, serving a particular
interest (preventing animal diseases, improving access to the city centre, etc.)
that arises from the process of balancing interests entails inflicting damage or
loss.24 For the principle of equality to be applicable, the damage or loss must
be the intended, or at least, the foreseenconsequence of the lawful balancing
of interests. Chapus formulates this as follows:
Scherr 2008, p. 220.19
L.N. Brown & J.S. Bell, French administrative law (Oxford 1998), p. 195-196.20
Zie f.e. G.C.A. Henriot, Le dommage anormal (Paris 1960), p. 54, who states that the equality
principle applies to situations where ‘une intention directe’ is present. He describes the concept
21
of a ‘charge publique’ as ‘un élément inhérent à l’activité administrative, au fonctionnement
des collectivités publiques, élément constant, inévitable, prévu’ (p. 52). See also Chapus and
Delvolvé, as stated below.
P. Delvolvé, Le principe d’égalité devant les charges publiques (Paris 1969), p. 352: ‘Puisque la
mesure dommageable est incontestable, les conséquences qu’elle entraîne directement doivent
être considérées comme nécessaires a l’intérêt général; elles s’imposent dans ce but.’
22
See C. Debbasch & F. Colin, Droit administratif (Paris 2007), p. 515: ‘Le dommage n’a pas de
caractère accidentel, il est la conséquence inévitable des mesures prises pas l’administration
23
dans l’intérêt général.’ Vgl. L. Romermann, Aufopferungshaftung in Europa (Tectum Verlag
2007), p. 92: ‘Statt desen wird die Kompensation all jener Schaden erfasst, die als unweigerliche
Folge des Verwaltungshandelns auftreten und als solche sicher vorhersehbar gewesen sind.’
M.K.G. Tjepkema, Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel (Deventer 2010), p. 202.24
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‘The principle of equality relates to situations where the damage/loss is not of
an occasional nature, as opposed to situations where liability based on risk is
relevant. It does not concern any damage/loss that arises from an unfortunate
combination of events that have occurred even though they could just as well
not have occurred. It concerns damage/loss that is the natural, necessary and
foreseeable result of specific situations or specific measures, as a consequence
of which the interests of specific members of society are being ‘sacrificed’ to
the demands of the general interest.’25
It is still not clearly established whether the other Member States have adopted
this interpretation of the equality concept as well. It is mainly French adminis-
trative law that is strongly characterised by differentiation in the principles
underlying no-fault liability; in the other Member States, this is the case to a
much lesser extent. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the above description
of liability based on the principle of equality is compatible with the way this
principle works in other countries. An example taken from the Dutch case law
may clarify this point.26 In 1985, the Minister of Agriculture issued a ministerial
regulation designed to eliminate the feeding of pigs with kitchen and
slaughterhouse waste (‘swill’). These food scraps presumably caused an infec-
tious disease among pigs, which the Minister wanted to put an end to as soon
as possible. An inherent, inevitable consequence of this regulation was that
farmers who fed their pigs on swill suffered huge financial losses: they had to
change their business operations in such a way that pigs could from then on
be fed in other ways as well. Moreover, the regulation meant that investments
that had been made for this type of feeding (which had to be cooked in special
boilers) were worthless. In particular, farmers who had based their business
operations on swill feeding – and who were therefore not able to change over
to another type of feeding – suffered such immense losses that they were entitled
to compensation, according to the Dutch Supreme Court. This Court ruled that
compared to his competitors, Leffers had been hit disproportionately heavily
by the ministerial regulation. Further, the substantial adverse consequences
resulting from this measure, which had been implemented overnight, could
not be attributed to normal entrepreneurial risks. Although the principle of
equality was not explicitly invoked, it is generally believed that the Supreme
Court was guided by this principle.
The Leffers judgment shows that it is possible to apply the principle of
equality to situations where the damage or loss – in this case, the loss suffered
by pig farmers who fed their pigs on swill – is an inevitable and foreseeable
consequence of a measure that serves the general interest. Based on this ex-
R. Chapus, Droit administratif general – Tomes I et II (Paris 2001), p. 1364.25
Supreme Court 18 January 1991, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1992, 638 (Leffers).26
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ample, it can also be proved by means of Chapus’ statement that the principle
of equality requires that the damage or loss is a necessary consequence of the
lawful public action: it is evident that the purpose the Minister intended to
pursue – to put an end to a potential source of spreading of African swine fever
– could not be achieved without inflicting damage on the pig farmers.
B The Special Burden
If the first condition is satisfied, this means only that the principle of
equality is applicable. This by no means implies that the principle has been vi-
olated too. For that to be the case, two additional conditions must be satisfied.
First, the damage or loss must be special. This element requires that the damage
or loss should not affect too large a group of citizens. The damage or loss must
be extreme, comparatively speaking, which means in this context: compared to
other citizens in a comparable position.
It is not always easy to determine exactly with which other citizens the
comparison must be made. Is it, for example, conceivable that all undertakings
that suffer damage or loss as a result of a statutory regulation are hit dispropor-
tionately heavily, compared to all undertakings that do not come within the
scope of the regulation? Or is a stricter approach required, which involves a
comparison of the undertaking affected with others that are also affected by the
action concerned, albeit less heavily? An analysis of the case law of the various
national courts reveals that this latter approach is indeed the more customary.
Usually, the reference group, i.e. those undertakings that have had to accept
the damage or loss without any compensation, concurs with the group for which
the measure had adverse effects. This means that as a rule, an undertaking will
argue in vain that it has suffered a disproportionate disadvantage compared to
undertakings outside its sector that have not been affected by the rule that has
caused the damage or loss (and to which this regulation does not apply). This
is also illustrated by case law of the Courts, who have applied the special criterion
in several cases.27 Accordingly, if any damage is caused by a statutory measure
that applies to a well-defined and determinable group of persons or undertak-
ings, it is a rule of thumb that the group to which the measure is applicable has
not been specially affected. They constitute the ‘reference group’, i.e. those who
will have to accept the damage or loss without any compensation. Only citizens
or undertakings that are able to distinguish themselves from the others within
that large group may claim compensation. In this context, they will have to
prove that the factors in respect of which they are distinct from the reference
group do not provide any objective and reasonable justification for an unequal
burden. This could concern the nature of the activity affected: the Leffers judgment
See f.e. the decisions Case T-196/99 Area Cova v. Council and Commission [2001], Jur. 2001, p.
II-3597, para. 167 and Case T-184/95 Dorsch Consult v. Council and Commission [1998], Jur.
1998, p. II-667, para. 28.
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shows that companies that specialise in some activity and are then confronted
with measures that are introduced overnight and that impose far-reaching re-
strictions on the exercise of that very activity may in certain circumstances claim
that they are suffering damage or loss to a disproportionate extent.
C The Abnormal Burden
In practice, the most important condition, which proves to be a high barrier
in many cases, is that the burden must also be abnormal. Usually, this condition
is considered equivalent to the question of whether the damage or loss is part
of the ‘normal societal risk’ or the ‘normal entrepreneurial risk’. This condition
too, requires that the burden on the person affected should be compared to
other burdens, but here the comparison is made at a more abstract level: in the
end, it comes down to the question whether the damage or loss is to be con-
sidered among the risks that are inherent to life in a community together with
others, or to the operation of a business in a specified sector. For example, this
involves an examination of the question of whether the injured party had fore-
seen or couldhave foreseen the relevant damage or loss. Another important
factor is the extentof the damage or loss: even though citizens and undertakings
must accept damage/loss they suffer as a result of lawful public actions to a
great extent, they are entitled in certain circumstances, to claim compensation
if they are confronted with excessive burdens.
A few examples may lend colour to these somewhat abstract notions. For
instance, the Dutch Supreme Court has ruled that in the case of the trade in
animal products, ‘there will sooner be an objectively foreseeable risk of diseases
and government measures taken as a result thereof for the purposes of public
health or otherwise’.28 In this context, another Dutch court, the Trade and In-
dustry Appeals Tribunal, refers to the ‘basic risk’ of the outbreak of an infectious
disease, which must, as a general rule, be borne by the entrepreneur, rather
than the state.29 With respect to damage resulting from traffic measures too, it
is established case law that such loss should as a general rule be considered
part of the normal societal risk. According to the Administrative Jurisdiction
Division of the Dutch Council of State, anybody may be confronted with such
damage/loss, which means that such loss can as a rule hardly be called abnor-
mal. The French administrative court too, adopts the position that damage/loss
due to changes in the infrastructure is part of the ‘risks the consequences of
which cannot be regarded as abnormal’.30
Supreme Court 20 June 2003, Administratiefrechtelijke beslissingen 2004, 84 (Harrida).28
CBB 29 februari 2000, AB 2000, 206. Compare Conseil d’Etat 22 februari 2002, Rec. p. 52
(Michel): animal diseass formulering a risk which should in principle be borne by those who
have the right to hunt.
29
CAA Lyon 8 February 1993, AJDA 1993, p. 706.30
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A risk attached to this criterion is that the requirements relating to abstract
notions such as ‘normal’ and ‘foreseeable’ are stretched to such an extent that
any possibility of obtaining compensation is rendered futile in advance, because
even the most serious forms of damage or loss are not completely unforeseeable.
A correct interpretation of this criterion should leave some scope for taking
individual circumstances into account. The relevant case law shows that one of
the reasons for concluding that specific damage or loss transcends normal en-
trepreneurial risks may lie in the way in which the measure has been imple-
mented. For example, the swill measure from the Leffers judgment as such was
not unforeseeable, but the sudden manner in which it had been implemented
was unforeseeable. According to the Dutch Supreme Court, entrepreneurs
trading in animal products cannot be expected to make sure ‘that they are able
to change over to a different method of operation, which is not affected by the
relevant prohibition, overnight, without the profitability of their company being
lost.’31
Accordingly, the foreseeability test is comprised of two stages: the court has
to examine not only whether the measure as such is foreseeable, but also
whether the manner in which the relevant measure has been implemented is
foreseeable. This could for example, concern the date on which the measure
enters into force: when in August 1980, French offshore fishermen occupied
all French harbours, all kinds of undertakings that were dependent on harbour
activities suffered losses. The authorities adopted the lawful decision not to issue
an order to vacate the harbours. The French Council of State took the view that
transporters of persons and cars from Britain to France were affected dispropor-
tionately heavily, and it took into consideration that the losses concerned were
sustained in the summer period, which was important for these undertakings.
They suffered a loss that was special (compared to the burdens that fell on
others that were affected by the government measure) and abnormal (since the
relevant companies’ revenues largely depended on transport in the summer
period).32
4 Comparative Law Observations
After these general reflections on the principle of equality, it
is time to focus on the liability of the EU again. The manner in which the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) derives arguments from comparative
law in developing EU-related liability – pursuant to art. 340 TFEU or in the
Supreme Court 20 June 2003, Administratiefrechtelijke beslissingen 2004, 84 (Harrida).31
CE 22 juni 1984, Rec. p. 246, D. 1986, p. 29-30 (Soc. Sealink; ‘un préjudice dont la spécialité
et la gravité ont été suffisantes pour qu’il soit regardé comme excédant les charges que les us-
agers du port doivent normalement supporter’).
32
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context of Member State liability – has invited critical comments on several
occasions in the past. For example, on the subject of Member State liability, it
was argued that the CJEU had suggested that this type of liability also found
some support in the law of the Member States. For some countries though, the
Francovich doctrine in any case was incompatible with the existing system of
state liability, which did not allow for an action for damages from unlawful ac-
tions of the legislature.33 With respect to art. 340 TFEU too, it may be said that
liability for unlawful legislative action by no means has a clear counterpart in
every Member State. Even so, this did not prevent the ECJ from accepting lia-
bility for unlawful legislative measures of the institutions in the case of a suffi-
ciently serious breach of a superior rule of law.
This example alone makes it clear that it is difficult to require a great extent
of convergence in the development of art. 340 TFEU.34 For this reason, it is
surprising that the ECJ attaches so much value to the small degree of conver-
gence in its refusal to accept a right to damages compensation at the level of
the EU. According to the ECJ, there is ‘convergence of those legal systems in
the establishment of a principle of liability in the case of unlawful action or an
unlawful omission of an authority, including of a legislative nature, [but] that
is no way the position as regards the possible existence of a principle of liability
in the case of a lawful act or omission of the public authorities, in particular
where it is of a legislative nature.’ In the absence of a clear right to compensation
for damages in the legal systems of the Member States, the ECJ would have
been well-advised not to accept this right.
Certainly where comparative law is so important a factor, the Court might
have been expected to address the question of to what extent this type of liabil-
ity is shared by the legal systems of the Member States in more detail, thus of-
fering a stronger factual basis to its decision. Besides, as is shown by their ar-
guments, the other parties involved in the FIAMM case sometimes play fast
and loose with the facts.35 The purpose of this section is to comment on the
ECJ’s judgementfrom a comparative law perspective.
France is a good example. See D. Poyaud, ‘Le fondement de la responsabilité du fait des lois
en cas de méconnaissance des engagements internationaux’, RFDA 2007, p. 525-534.
33
Compare Beatson & Tridimas, New directions in European public law (Oxford 1998), p. 16: ‘[Lia-
bility] is not based in principles common to the laws of the Member States (…). [W]ith regard
34
to state liability arising from acts of the legislature there are no general principles which are
truly common to the Member States.’
See the statement of the Council, the Commission and the Kingdom of Spain stating that in
only two countries the possibility of liability for legislative action is recognized (Opinion AG
35
Maduro, para. 54). This does in any way not take note of the Leffers-case, which, as stated above,
involved a lawful legislative act.
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4.1 Incorrect Use of the Comparative Law Method
The ECJ’s comparative law ground has been criticised in liter-
ature.36 It has been rightly pointed out that in developing Art. 340 TFEU, the
ECJ should not be exclusively guided by a quantitative approach.37 It goes too
far to only consider a legal principle ‘common’ if it is recognised as such in all
Member States: with that approach, a few dissident Member States would have
a power of veto.38 For the same reason, it is not right to allow the opinion of the
majority to be decisive, as this could result in the Court having to derogate from
current case law if new Member States, whose laws differ in this respect, join
the Union.
The only method that reflects the diversity of the various legal systems of
the EU Member States and that is sufficiently flexible to be used as a basis for
developing Art. 340 TFEU at the level of the EU is the theory of ‘value-based
comparative law’. According to this theory, the ECJ should examine which of
the key concepts identified in the Member States is best in line with Union law.
In the end, the decisive question is whether a specified legal concept is consistent
with the system and the special structure of the European legal order rather
than simply following the Member States. According to this theory, a liability
regime must only be rejected if it is not in line with the system and the special
structure of the European legal order at all.39 In his opinion in the FIAMM case,
advocate-general Maduro defended this approach.
‘The decisive question is whether such a solution would best meet the specific
needs of the Community legal system. That does not mean that the principle
of public authorities’ liability for a lawful legislative act should be enshrined in
the Community legal order inasmuch as it would appear to be the best legal
solution, and as such must be adopted in the Community legal order.’40
According to Kapteyn et al., it is up to the ECJ, at the end of the day, to examine
the systems of the Member States and elements that contribute to ‘a fitting,
fair and productive solution to the issue of Community liability’.41 Below, in
See f.e. L. Coutron, ‘Responsabilité pour faute et responsabilité sans faute en droit commun-
autaire. Les approximations de l’arrêt FIAMM’, RFDA 2009, p. 329 a.o, Tjepkema 2010, p.
814 et seq.
36
See f.e. W. van Gerven, ‘Taking Art. 215 (2) EC Seriously’, in: J. Beatson & T. Tridimas, New
directions in European Public Law (Oxford 1998), p. 44-45.
37
See for further reading F. Fines, Etude de la responsabilité extracontractuelle de la communauté
économique Européene (Paris 1990), p. 35.
38
Van Casteren 1997, p. 54.39
Opinion in Case C-120/06, para. 56.40
P.J.G. Kapteyn, L.A. Geelhoed, K.J.M. Mortelmans (red.), Het recht van de Europese Unie en van
de Europese Gemeenschappen (Deventer 2003), p. 388.
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section 5, I will argue that the question of what exactly amounts to ‘fitting and
fair’ under EU law has a strongly political dimension. This is why I will leave
this point for now.
4.2 Solid Basis for a Right to Compensation for Damages in
the Member States
Even if the quantity-based approach is replaced by a quality-
based approach, it is clear that a solid basis for a right to damages compensation
in the case of legislative and other acts in the Member States might well be a
strong argument for accepting a right to damages compensation at EU level.
To what extent is there a legal basis in the Member States for a right to com-
pensation for damages? It can hardly be denied that the ECJ was right to observe
that there is not a great deal of convergence between the various legal systems
on this issue. For example, a general right to compensation for damages,
whether statutory or extrastatutory, is not recognised, in any case, in countries
with a common lawtradition, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Cyprus and
Malta.42 In these countries, the position is taken that apart from the traditional
liability based on torts, it is not incumbent on the courts to create other forms
of state liability. Since this concerns a pre-eminently political issue, this is a
responsibility to be taken up only by the legislator.43 The Scandinavian countries,
Austria and Greece also show that state liability for matters other than unlawful
acts has been primarily a legislative issue and that only occasionally were special
laws enacted that provided for some kind of liability for lawful acts.44
By contrast, in a second group of countries, the courts (usually administrative
courts but sometimes civil courts) have played a leading role and were not afraid
to accept liability in cases where specials laws do not provide for any compens-
ation. Currently, there are nine EU Member States that belong to this second
group: France, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Por-
tugal, Estonia and Poland.45 Some of these countries have adopted a general
statutory regulation governing the liability of public authorities, which is com-
prised of not only unlawful but also lawful acts (Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg,
Poland, Estonia, and soon the Netherlands). In these countries, the legislator
is not the only one to determine whether and if so, to what extent, citizens who
suffer any damages as a result of lawful actions are entitled to compensation.
In addition, the courts play a role in this process as well: they can force the au-
See for more details Tjepkema 2010, p. 790 et seq.42
See Harlow, Tort law and beyond (Oxford 2004), p. 61. Harlow is of the opinion that the question
whether a right to compensation exists in cases where no fault can be pointed out, is not a part
of liability law, but is part of a ‘non-legal process’.
43
See Tjepkema 2010, p. 792 et seq.44
Tjepkema 2010, p. 779-789.45
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thority who has refused to pay compensation or who gave too little to repair
this by offering some compensation. In these countries, it is therefore the judge,
and not the legislator who has the last word in deciding whether compensation
should be given. Finally, it is worth mentioning that in their review of decisions
on compensation for damages, the courts consider the political dimension of
this doctrine by carrying out a rather limited judicial review of whether the ad-
ministrative authority gave a reasonable interpretation of the concept of ‘normal
societal risk’.46
4.3 Dubious Limitation of Liability to Non-legislative Measures
The grounds given by the ECJ in the FIAMM judgment may
be interpreted such that it leaves no room for a right to compensation for
damages in the case of any damage or loss due to lawful legislative measures.
The FIAMM judgment implies that if a legislative measure does not constitute
a sufficiently serious breach, any form of liability under Art. 340 TFEU is ex-
cluded. To this extent, the unlawful Union act is of an ‘exclusive’ nature. By
excluding legislative measures from any possibility to claim compensation for
damages, the ECJ has in actual fact ‘clipped the wings’ of this doctrine.
With respect to legislative measures in particular, the exclusion of a right
to compensation for damages is highly remarkable. First, it is at odds with the
trend that was triggered by the Bergaderm judgment and that continued to shape
the relevant case law afterwards, namely that, as far as the liability conditions
are concerned, the ECJ no longer makes any distinction between legislative acts
and other acts that cause damage or loss.47 In the current case law, all these
acts are assessed against the criterion of the sufficiently serious breach. If there
is hardly any margin for discretion, the mere infringement of EU law may be
sufficient to conclude that there has been a sufficiently serious breach.48 At the
very least, it is remarkable that FIAMM since Bergaderm, the ECJ has subjected
all acts of the institutions to the same liability regime (i.e. that of the sufficiently
serious breach) and in doing so, it has no longer made any distinction between
legislative and other acts, even if this distinction is made in the context of liabil-
ity for a lawful act.
A second point of criticism is more fundamental. In none of the Member
States that recognise the principle of equality is there any support for the exclu-
In Dutch literature, this limited review is a point of debate. Some authors take the view that
the judge is perfectly capable of judging whether the damage has surpassed the normal societal
46
risk has been surpassed or not. See the debates in Barkhuysen, Den Ouden & Tjepkema (red.),
Coulant compenseren? Over overheidsaansprakelijkheid en rechtspolitiek (Deventer 2012).
Case C-352-98P Bergaderm v. Commission [2000] ECR I-5291.47
Vgl. Case C-5/94 Hedly Lomas v. Council and Commission [1996] ECR I-2553, para. 28.48
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sion of a right to compensation for damages in the case of legislative acts.49
Indeed the principle of equality has been very important to acts which involve
discretionary power in particular. As stated above, the fact that any damages
arise from the lawful balancing of interests – including interests served by
economic policy choices – is even a prerequisite to the application of the principle
of equality.50 Even though there are examples of successful claims for compens-
ation for damages in the Member States that recognise the principle of equality,
particularly in the field of infrastructure measures (the public works) and de-
cisions, the option of bringing claims against the State on the ground of lawful
legislative action is not excluded as a matter of principlein various countries,
namely in France51, Spain,52 Germany,53 Luxembourg54 and the aforementioned
Leffers decision from the Netherlands. Admittedly, in some countries (such as
Spain) this case law has been highly controversial and exceptional.55 In other
countries however (such as Germany, France and the Netherlands), there is a
substantial body of case law on no-fault liability. What is more, in these countries
the leading caseson compensation for damages relate to losses due to legislative
acts. Examples include the above-mentioned Leffers judgment, the German
judgment in the Plfichtexemplar case and the French judgments in the La
Fleurette and Caucheteux et Desmonts cases.
There is also an explanation for the fact that a right to compensation for
damages is sometimes recognised in legislation. By its very nature, the assess-
ment made by the legislator is abstract in nature. The legislator is primarily
concerned with the question of whether a reasonable legal balance has been
struck between the purposes he seeks to achieve and the impairment of the
interests of those directly involved. Generally speaking, the legislator is unable,
to take account of all adverse consequences that may arise from the application
of legislation in a concrete case. For example, when he issued the ministerial
In the same sense Van Casteren 1997, p. 252.49
The Dutch Council of State, for example, does not recognize a right to compensation for
damages when the authority in question had no possibility whatsoever to take the damaged
50
interest into account when taking the measure which caused the damage (ABRvS 16 June 2005,
AB 2007, 11).
CE 14 January 1938, Rec. p. 25 (La Fleurette) and CE 21 January 1944, Rec. p. 22 (Caucheteux et
Desmonts).
51
See Van Casteren 1997, p. 187, who discusses a decision of the Tribunal Supremo from 1993.
See on Spanish state liability law also C. Plaza, ‘Member States Liability for Legislative Injustic’
[2010] REALaw, p. 27 e.v.
52
See the decision Pflichtexemplar (1981) from the Bundesverfassungsgericht.53
See G. Ravarani, La responsabilité civile de l’Etat (Luxembourg 2006), paras 278 and 330.54
Already in the 90’s the Spanish Supreme Court acknowledged that, given certain conditions,
Parliamentary Acts which had not been declared unconstitutional (and therefore were in
55
principle lawful) could give rise to the right to compensation for damages that breach legitimate
expectations and/or that impose a special and onerous burdens on the plaintiff as a result of
the implementation of its provisions (see, among others, STS of 17 February 1998 Nº Recurso
327/1993; STS of 29 February 2000, Nº Recurso 49/1998).
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regulation for the purpose of imposing a swill ban, the minister was presumably
not aware that in the Leffers case the application of this regulation would in
some instances result in an unexpected and excessive loss. In particular, the
consequences arising from measures that affect large groups of people, and
that must be taken within a short space of time, cannot usually be predicted
with precision. In the case of damages or losses due to lawful legislation, the
‘well-considered’ sacrifice of interests remains, by its very nature limited to the
general abstract level, i.e. to the question of whether a reasonable legal balance
has been struck between the objectives the legislator seeks to achieve and the
impairment of the interests of those directly involved. In the case of legislation,
this element cannot possibly relate to the application of a law in a concrete case.
Accordingly, the foregoing warrants the conclusion that in the case of legislation,
the above-mentioned necessary relationship between damages/losses and the
general interest does not exist between the disproportionate consequences and
the lawful act. Usually, the disproportionality of the damages or losses concerns
an unforeseen and unintended effect of the application of the power in concrete
terms. It is precisely in those cases that the equality principle can entail liability
of public authorities. In the field of economic law, the taking into account of
individual circumstances entails specific problems however, as will be discussed
in the next paragraph.
5 The Problems of No-Fault Liability in the Field of
Economic Law and the Influence of Efficiency
Arguments
When discussing the possible added value of a no-fault liabil-
ity regime, one should not forget that the case law of the European Courts does
not even show one example of a case in which this type of liability was success-
fully invoked. It should be pointed out however, that almost the same thing can
be said when looking at the national regimes of compensation for damages in
the field of economic law. Admittedly, the landmark La Fleurette case of the
French Council of State took place in the field of economic law. This case con-
cerned a law which forbade the production of ‘gradine’, which could replace
dairy products; by doing so, the French government hoped to protect the dairy
industry. La Fleurette specialised in the production of gradine and had to end
its businesses. According to the Council of State, the legislator, who – neither
in the law itself nor in the explanatory memorandum – paid any special attention
to companies such as La Fleurette, could not have intended to ignore the damage
to La Fleurette so the disproportionate damage suffered by La Fleurette had to
be compensated. Even afterthis landmark ruling, there have been very few
successful claims based on the principle of equality where the damage arises
from the lawful Acts of Parliament in the field of economic planning. Terneyre
calls the La Fleurette judgment a typical product of his time in this respect, being
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a ‘liberal reaction of the Council of State to the first manifestations of economic
interventionism’.56
It should be noted that laws in the field of economics often imply that choices
are made that are favourable for some and unfavourable for others, because
some undertakings are allowed to do certain things which others are not, or
because one group, often at the expense of another, is subject to a specific fa-
vourable regime. The detrimental act is often inherently discriminatory: inter-
vention in economic life is guided by the idea that only those undertakings that
are performing an activity that is the most needed or that favourably stands out
compared to others for other reasons, should enjoy a benefit. This may explain
why the introduction of a licensing regime does not usually involve the accept-
ance of any obligation to pay compensation: when the legislature introduces a
licensing scheme, leading to the granting of licenses to some parties and to the
refusal of a licence to others, there is an implicit understanding that the last
mentioned parties cannot claim compensation, since they did not qualify for a
licence. Granting compensation in one case will almost certainly set a precedent
for other cases, making the implementation of economic policy extremely diffi-
cult.57 If the inequality complained of is the natural result of the objective the
legislature intended to achieve, the added value of the principle of equality before
public burdens – as well as the general principle of equality – will be limited.58
This does not mean however, that Union money is never spent on damages
inflicted by lawful acts of union institutions acting within the sphere of economic
law. The cases in which this happenend are interesting enough to point out,
since they show that it is not considerations of equity but efficiency that will often
be an important reason for compensation. This may not come as a surprise. It
is no secret that the Court of Justice lends great weight to legal policy when it
comes to the recognition and development of new forms of liability.59 As is well
known, this effect was of paramount importance to the ECJ in the development
of Member State liability. Clearly, this liability was not just motivated by the
fact that it may contribute to the loyal implementation of Community law, but
P. Terneyre, ‘Reponsabilité en matière d’interventions économiques’, in: P.-L. Frier & D. de
Béchillon (red.), Dalloz Encyclopédie de Droit Public: Répertoire de la responsabilité de la puissance
publique (Paris 1999), para. 122.
56
See also the Opinion of AG Koopmans in the Dutch case of the dairy farmer De Waal, who
suffered damage after the introduction of a quota scheme (Supreme Court 18 April 1997, NJ
57
1997, 456). Koopmans pointed out that it is up to the legislator to take individual circumstances
into account, by making exceptions and taking up hardship clauses. If the legislator did not
take an individual circumstance into account (such as, in De Waal’s case, the unfavorable
choice of a certain year as a reference year for the allowable quantum of cows to be held) the
judge will have to bow to this, Koopmans stated.
See also CE 29 mei 1985, Rec. p. 162 (Société ‘Trans-Union’), CE 13 oktober 1978, Rec. p. 370
(Perthuis).
58
R. Meijer, ‘Rechtspolitieke afwegingen in de Unie- en lidstaataansprakelijkheid’, in: Barkhuysen,
Den Ouden & Tjepkema (red.), Coulant compenseren? (Deventer: Kluwer 2012), p. 659-672.
59
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just as much by the assertion that the effective application of EU law would be
impeded if the Member States were not given the opportunity to hold the state
liable for the faulty transposition of EU law. Consequently, liability has a
primarily instrumental character in this context: it is a means to guarantee the
aim of effective application of EU law.60
In my opinion, the CJEU and the institutions in their capacity as legislator
will not be guided by fairness arguments in practice. In all likelihood, a more
important factor will be whether the grant of compensation, in cases not in-
volving unlawful acts, may help to achieve the objectives of the Union. The
manner in which the right to compensation for damages functions in the
Member States also shows that this right quite often has a more instrumental
function. In the Netherlands for example, compensation for the purpose of
achieving environmental objectives is sometimes promised in the context of
negotiations on a new environmental permit.61 In addition, compensation is
sometimes motivated by the wish to prevent injured parties from taking action
against the detrimental action itself.62 If one considers the situations in which
the institutions have awarded compensation payments without having performed
any unlawful acts to date, it is clear that efficiency and/or social and economic
arguments played an important part in these situations, more so than equity-
related concerns.
The first example is derived from the Council decision of 26th October 1995.63
The background of this decision was the problematic situation that had arisen
for roughly 700 Spanish and Portuguese fishermen who carried out fishing
activities in the waters subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Morocco.
Their losses were not caused by any legislative act, but by the termination of a
fishery agreement between the Community and Morocco. This agreement had
been terminated prematurely with effect from 30th April 1995 with the intention
to conclude a new agreement with effect from 1st May 1995. Because it became
impossible to round off the negotiations before the latter date, and the fishermen
had had to discontinue their activities with effect from 30th April, they were fa-
cing – in the words of the Council – ‘an exceptional situation of particular seri-
ousness’. For this reason, the Council issued a decision granting the fishermen
an indemnity for the losses that directly resulted from the failure to renew the
agreement. According to the Council, one of the reasons for awarding this
compensation was the risk that the sudden discontinuation could result in ‘a
serious disturbance of the economy’. Clearly, the granting of compensation
According to T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: OUP 1999),
p. 60 the development of Member State liability should even be regarded as ‘pure policy’.
60
See the report Schadevergoeding. Advies van de Evaluatiecommissie Wet milieubeheer over de toep-
assing van de schadevergoedingsbepalingen in de Wet milieubeheer, ECWM 2003/16.
61
See for further reading Tjepkema 2010, p. 739 et seq.62
PbEG 1995, L 264/28.63
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was not primarily motivated by the wish to alleviate the hardship of a limited
group of fisherman, but more so by the wish to protect the local economy. This
shows that the function of no-fault liability on the level of the European Union
is above all instrumental: it is likely to be principly used where the granting of
compensation can help prevent harm to interests protected by the EU institu-
tions. From this perspective, one wonders whether it is up the EU courts to
develop a system of no-fault liability, given the strong ties this type of liability
has with EU policy.
This can also be illustrated by a second example concerning the losses un-
dertakings may suffer if livestock has to be killed on a large scale after the out-
break of an infectious disease. Not only does EU policy determine what measures
the Member States have to take – even though these measures are carried out
at the national level – but it is also the Council of the European Union that has
created the possibility of granting a financial contribution to the Member States
to cover the costs incurred by them for the purpose of combating infectious
animal diseases. Pursuant to a Council decision, a Member State that has in-
curred costs in combating diseases specified in the decision may claim a finan-
cial contribution, provided that the Member State has arranged for ‘swift and
adequate compensation’.64 In that case, the Member State qualifies for a financial
contribution of 50% of the costs incurred for the purpose of indemnifying the
livestock farmers and other costs, such as vaccination costs. Unlike what one
might suppose, this decision is not primarily dictated by the need to satisfy the
requirements imposed by the right to property. Rather, the reason for the de-
cision is that it is highly important in the case of an outbreak of an animal dis-
ease to identify the sources of infection as soon as possible. If this does not
happen, the process of combating diseases will become harder and lengthier
and, as a result, more expensive. Awarding compensation is a suitable means
to keep the threshold for notifications as low as possible and contain the risk
that the area of infection will grow larger.65
In my opinion, it is difficult to underestimate the importance of this function
of liability for a lawful act to the further development of this doctrine at EU
level. Even though it is customary to regard compensation for damages as a
‘mere palliative’, meant for cases where an individual has to make a dispropor-
tionate contribution to the promotion of the general interest, it is to be expected
that compensation for damages at the level of the EU will be relevant mainly if
the economic interests of the Union itself are at stake. Viewed from this per-
spective, the outcome of the FIAMM judgments is hardly surprising, since it
is hard to argue that compensating the FIAMM companies would in any way
facilitate EU policy.
PbEG 18 juni 2009, L 155/30.64
See the conclusion of AG Jacobs, 29 November 2001, C-428/99 (Van den Bor), § 32.65
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6 The Future of No-Fault Liability within the EU
A final, obvious question that remains to be answered is
whether there is a future for the doctrine of compensation for damages within
the EU. Is it enough to maintain the current status quo, where no-fault liability
is primarily policy based but where the CJEU has little time for equity-based
arguments? Is something to be said for AG Maduro’s statement that the recog-
nition of a regime of strict liability might serve as an outlet for the high barriers
of the unlawful act regime?66 And – as will probably be the case – if the CJEU
sticks to its decision in the FIAMM case, what other ways of redress are available
for undertakings who suffer damage as a result of legal actions of the EU? These
questions will be answered in the following paragraph. I will first examine the
possibilities of compensation for damages within art. 340 TFEU (para. 6.2).
Then I will discuss the two ways of redress the ECJ pointed out in the FIAMM
case: an action by the legislature (para 6.2) and the possibility of relying on the
violation of property rights (para 6.3).
6.1 Damage Compensation under Article 340 TFEU
Since the CJEU limited the refusal of the recognition of no-
fault liability to legislative action, it would seem plausible that there is indeed
some room left under art. 340 TFEU for a right to compensation for damages.
It is doubtful however, whether this means anything in practice. In the first
place, the CJEU interprets the concept of ‘legislative measure’ in a broad sense,
it includes not only legislative acts but also certain decisions. ‘In the context of
an action for damages, the [legislative – MT] character depends on the nature
of the measure in question, not its form,’ according to the Court.67 Hence, even
though decisions relate to individual cases, they can be of a legislative nature
if they entail economic policy choices. A case in point is the Live Pigs case, where
Italy and the Netherlands suffered a loss as a result of a decision addressed to
them, because only in these countries had a swine vesicular disease been
identified, and therefore only these countries were prohibited from exporting
live pigs to other Member States for a specified period. When an action for
damages was brought under art. 288 EU (art. 340 TFEU), these decisions were
regarded as legislative measures, however. Other case law too, shows that the
most relevant criterion for considering an act as ‘legislative’ is whether the in-
stitutions have any discretion in performing the relevant act.68
Opinion in Case C-120 and 121/06 FIAMM a.o. v. Commission and Council [2008], para. 57.66
ECJ 11 February 1999, Case C-390/95 (Antillian Rice Mills).67
CFI 13 December 1995, zaak T-484/93 (Live Pigs). Compare CFI 15 April 1997, Case T-390/94
(Aloys Schröder). See also C. Stefanou & H. Xanthaki, A legal and political interpretation of Article
215 (2) [new article 288(2)] of the Treaty of Rome (Ashage: Dartmouth 2000), p. 89-90.
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Second, although there are also acts that are of a purely implementing nature
and that do not therefore entail any economic policy choice,69 it is hardly con-
ceivable that such acts could ever give rise to an obligation to pay compensation
for damages. This is because disputes arising from such acts often involve im-
plementation mistakes (miscalculations, faulty procedures etc.) that will give
rise to an action based on an unlawful act.70 In addition, the Union hardly ever
concerns itself with acts without an intended legal effect, and here too, an action
based on an unlawful act is more likely than an action based on a lawful act.
As stated in paragraph 4, the arguments that the Court presented to refuse
a right to compensation for damages are not entirely convincing. At the same
time, the FIAMM decision might come at less of a surprise upon realisation
that the the CJEU’s line of reasoning is in fact quite consistent with its case law
in the case of the (non-contractual) liability for unlawful acts. Generally speaking,
the thresholds regarding this type of liability are very high, demanding that the
infringement of a rule of law by the institution is ‘sufficiently serious’.71 This
is only seldom the case. With the Bergaderm judgment, the liability barriers
have even been raised, since the ‘sufficiently serious breach’ criterion is also
applicable to non-legislative acts. At the very least, it would be at odds with these
high liability barriers if, mainly on the grounds of fairness, the CJEU created
a regime of strict liability in which the lawfulness of the cause of the damage
or loss is taken as the point of departure and required ‘only’ that the relevant
act has led to a ‘special’ and ‘abnormal’ damage or loss.72In English law too,
the high barriers relating to state liability for unlawful acts have been used not
so much as an argument for the recognition of liability for a lawful act but as
an argument against it.73 This does not mean that compensation for damages
as such is incompatible with the legal system of the EU, but this requires a
more thorough reasoning than the argument that it is an outlet for the high
barriers of the unlawful act regime.
In the end, it is doubtful whether a general right to compensation for dam-
ages under art. 340 TFEU will stand any chance. Tridimas is probably right
when he points out that a right to compensation for damages will is only likely
See also J. Wakefield, Judicial Protection through the use of art. 288(2)EC (The Hague 2002), p.
64: ‘The administrative function stretches from the highest level of implementation of policy
to the lowest level of simple application of rules within pre-defined constraints’.
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Examples of ‘administrative acts’ are mentioned by Biondi & Farley, The right to damages in
European Law (2009), p. 103 e.v.
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Compare J. Jans a.o., Europeanisation of public law (Europa Law Publishing 2007), p. 258, who
speak of a ‘strict criterion’.
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See my case note on the FIAMM-case in AB 2008, 311 and in the same sense R. Meijer, ‘Niet-
contractuele aansprakelijkheid voor rechtmatig handelen. Toch geen beginsel van
gemeenschapsrecht?’, Overheid & Aansprakelijkheid 2009, p. 156.
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D. Fairgrieve, State liability in tort (Oxford 2003), p. 137: ‘[T]he English judiciairy has – until
recently – shown a marked reluctance to allow negligence liability of public authorities, let
alone any extension into liability based on risk or liability for lawful administrative action.’
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to exist where a measure has an ‘expropriatory character’.74 Similarly, Craig has
stated that the conditions, which have to be met for a right to compensation to
exist, should not be underestimated.75 Especially the criterion of the ‘risks in-
herent in trading’ will offer the Community Courts a good opportunity to refuse
a right to compensation. The FIAMM decision has showed that even producers
of batteries, who are not aware of banana market legislation at all, carry an in-
herent risk of retaliation measures, even where retaliation as such is not fore-
seeable. Furtermore, in the past the Community Courts have accepted that even
damage stemming from unlawful acts belongs, up to a certain extent, to the
‘normal risks inherent in trading’.76 Of course, the courts’ stringent position
on this can be criticised,77 but it is a position that is all too familiar. This is not
only reflected by the difficulty in finding the institutions liable for unlawful
action, but also in the case law concerning breaches of the right to property,
where the Court has in the past refused to offer any kind of compensation to
German importers of bananas, even though they lost an important market share
after the introduction of new legislation, and even though they saw their profits
disappear and had to fire a substantial number of their personnel.78 In essence,
Maduro is right in saying that these high hurdles are an apt way of preventing
an unlimited development of no-fault liability. Still, the question remains of
what then might be the exact added value of recognising this concept at all.
In the light of all this, one might wonder what would have been the added
value of the recognition of the equality principle. In particular, it is the question
of whether the advantage of the recognition of an almost theoretical type of lia-
bility weighs up to disadvantages which are not theoretical at all, when recog-
nising the equality principle, it is highly probable that the Courts would have
been overwhelmed with claims for compensation for damages. The prospect
of dealing with these claims might well have withheld the ECJ from taking the
last step towards the recognition of a right to compensation for damages.
6.2 A Statutory Regulation
In the absence of an enforceable right to compensation for
damages in the case of legislative action, affected undertakings are dependent
mainly on the will of the institutions to award compensation in a decision or
Tridimas 2006, p. 495.74
Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: OUP 2006), p. 781.75
See e.g. Case C-27/60 Meroni [1961] ECR 1961-348 and Joined Cases C-83 and 94/76, BHNL,
Jur. 1978, p. 1209.
76
See the critical notes of Anne Thies’ case note on FIAMM, Common Market Law Review 2006,
p. 1165.
77
See the opnion of AG Gulmann in Case C-280/93, ECR I-4973, para. 83 et seq. This case is a
notorious example of the reticence of the CJEU in liabity cases. See also I. Pernice, ‘Le recours
en indemnité’, Cahiers du Droit Européen 1995, p. 641 et seq. on p. 653-654.
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under a special scheme, for reasons of solidarity or for pragmatic reasons. This
type of legislation and/or resolutions has not really taken off, but there are some
examples. First, there are many regulations and decisions with a liability clause
in which the non-contractual liability of the relevant institution is made subject
to the general principles which the legal systems or the laws of the Member
States have in common and which are therefore in line with the wording of art.
340 TFEU.79 As long as one accepts that after FIAMM, compensation for
damages cannot entirely be written off as a doctrine, there may also be a right
to compensation for damages in these special areas.
For affected undertakings, the reference to the ability of the institutions to
draft statutory provisions in cases of this kind is less favourable than founding
the right to compensation for damages directly on Art. 340 TFEU because un-
dertakings depend on the cooperation of the institutions to establish the exist-
ence of liability,. Still, the discretionary power of the institutions to adopt com-
pensation legislation might be the most important road to compensation for
the time being. In particular the much discussed issue on the way to offer re-
dress to innocent victims of retaliatory measures, such as the FIAMM case,
might be better dealt with by a special regulation than under art. 340 TFEU.
First, this path is sensible because the CJEU can compensate victims without
recognising in abstract terms that a right to compensation exists. By laying
down the right to compensation for damages in a regulation, innocent victims
are compensated, but the CJEU need not answer the question whether it is
prepared to recognise a right to compensation for damages in a ‘normal’ situ-
ation where a lawful regulation causes damage.80
A second reason to prefer a compensation regulation above action on the
basis of Art. 340 TFEU is that it is highly dubious whether a right to compens-
ation for damages for innocent exporters could be based on this article. When
a right to compensation for damages is based on art. 340 TFEU is read in the
light of the equality principle – which seems most plausible – it is doubtful
whether it could offer a solid basis for compensation in cases such as FIAMM.
Indeed, in the FIAMM case the damage did not result directly from a lawful
regulation or any other Community act, but from a response by a third country
to an EU institution’s failure to comply with WTO rules. Since the damage did
not directly result from a lawful act of a Union institution, it may be argued
that any no-fault liability based on Art. 340 TFEU could offer no solution to the
exporters if the principle of equality was the basis for such liability. The mere
See f.e. Art. 3 of the Decision of the Council of 17 december 1999, PbEG 1999, L 337/41, and
Art. 21 of Council Regulation (EC) establishing a Community Fisheries Control Agency and
79
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the common
fisheries policy.
In the same sense M. Bronckers & S. Goelen, ‘De aansprakelijkheid van de EU voor
schendingen van het WTO-recht’, in: Barkhuysen, Den Ouden & Tjepkema, Coulant compenseren
(Deventer 2012), p. 689.
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fact that the unlawful nature of an act has not been established is insufficient
to ‘activate’ the principle of equality. For this to be the case, the damage should
somehow be a necessary sacrifice to achieve any political objective (supra, para.
2), which was not the case in the FIAMM case. There is no support for this
from the comparative law perspective either: no Member State recognises a
right to compensation for damages based on the sole fact that the unlawfulness
of an act cannot be established. The reference to the principle of equality has
therefore been rightly called ‘artful’ by one commentator, this reference was
said to be dictated by the single ‘need to grant some relief to those who were
negatively affected by conduct which cannot be declared illegal’.81
A third and last reason is that the method of legislation allows the scope of
the obligation to pay compensation to be controlled properly. This relates not
only to determining what items of damage or loss qualify for compensation but
also to the interpretation of the criterion of ‘normal entrepreneurial risk’. If it
is accepted that even innocent importers, who are not part of the sector in which
the violation of WTO law has occurred, run some risk of facing retaliatory
measures, it can also be argued that it should be laid down in a statutory provi-
sion that a specified percentage of the damage or loss suffered is to be borne
by the injured parties themselves. This can take the form of a threshold, where
the loss must exceed a certain percentage of turnover in order to qualify for
compensation. It is also conceivable that a discount will be applied where the
damage or loss is compensated in principle, not in full but rather, for example
only 60%. In the discussion about the interpretation of the normal entrepren-
eurial risk, it is often argued that this also depends on political choices; it is the
EU legislator that is the most appropriate body for making these choices.
6.3 The Right to Property
In the FIAMM judgment, the ECJ pointed out not only the
possibility of a statutory compensation scheme but also referred to the possibil-
ity that protection can be based on the right to property. It turns out that the
case law of the ECJ on this point is for the most part oriented towards property
protection under the ECHR. The fundamental rights of the ECHR are considered
to be part of EU law as general principles. If and to the extent that they imple-
ment EU law, the EU institutions and the Member States are therefore bound
by Art. 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR as well. Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty
codifies this case law and even extends the binding nature of fundamental rights
M. Dani, ‘Remedying European Pluralism: the FIAMM and Fedon litigation and the judicial
protection of international trade bystanders’ [2010] The European Journal of International Law,
p. 331.
81
33Review of European Administrative Law 2013-1
BETWEEN EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NO-FAULT LIABILITY
as general principles of EU law to the entire European Union.82 Like the ECtHR,
the ECJ puts great emphasis on the fact that the right to property and the free-
dom to pursue a trade or business are not absolute, but should be viewed in
relation to their social function.83 As the well-known Hauer judgment reads: ‘The
exercise of the right to property may (...) be restricted, provided that these restrictions
in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and
that, with regard to the aim pursued, they should not constitute a disproportionate
and intolerable interference with the rights of the owner, such as to impinge upon the
very substance of the right to property.’84
The right to property test has many parallels with a test based on the principle
of equality, although both principles do not completely overlap. A significant
difference with the principle of equality test is that the legitimate objectives,
which the institutions pursue in the general interest, are an independent factor
in the context of the proportionality test. Restrictions can be imposed on the
exercise of the right to property to the extent that they ‘in fact correspond to ob-
jectives of general interest pursued by the Community and that, with regard to the
aim pursued, they should not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference
with the rights of the owner, such as to impinge upon the very substance of the right
to property.’85 The nature of this test may be illustrated by the aforementioned
Hauer judgment. Ms Hauer wanted to use her land as a vineyard, but she was
refused a planting permit, because her site was said to be unsuitable for wine
growing. She successfully objected to this refusal, but pending this action, a
regulation prohibiting any planting of new vines came into force. The German
court sought a preliminary ruling from the ECJ about whether the regulation
was contrary to the right to property, primarily because the EEC Regulation did
not make it clear whether the regulation prevented granting the authorisation
(which would have undoubtedly been granted but for the regulation). The ECJ
ruled that the right to property had not been infringed, partly because the
measure was of a temporary nature and had been taken to deal immediately
with a situation characterisced by surpluses. If, as the ECJ ruled, new planting
of vines was permitted, this would from the economic point of view, only in-
crease the surplus. For that reason, the temporary restriction did not affect the
substance of the right to ownership.86 In practice, this approach to the propor-
tionality test will not easily result in the assumption that the right to property
has been infringed. An ‘individual interest’ will quickly be defeated by these
general interests, all the more so because in practice the Courts adopt a flexible
C-36/75 Rutili Roland v. Ministre de l'intérieur [1975] ECR I-1219 and C-46/87 Hoechst [1989]
ECR I-1549.
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Case C-44/79 Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, ECR 1979-3727.84
Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] ECR II-03305, para. 457).85
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attitude in its assessment against general interests relied on.87 To date, the ECJ
has only in one case ruled that the right to property was violated and that the
general interest could therefore not justify an infringement.88
Another important factor is that the restriction on the right to property that
was at issue in Hauer directly related to her options for exploiting her land in
the way she desired. It is hardly surprising that this meant an infringement of
her right to property rights. In a normal situation where a new legislative
measure limits a market share to a considerable degree, it is highly debatable
whether there exists a right to property in the first place. A good example is to
be found in the ECJ’s approach to the ‘banana cases’. A regulation on the
common market for bananas had particularly adverse consequences for German
importers of bananas. Previously, they had been able to benefit from favourable
national schemes and after the entry into force of the regulation, they faced a
substantial reduction of their earlier market share, which led to ‘tangible’ and
‘far-reaching’ changes in existing economic structures, the transfer of consider-
able profit potential to other Member States and mass redundancies.89
‘The right to property of traders in third-country bananas is not called into
question by the introduction of the Community quota and the rules for its
subdivision. No economic operator can claim a right to property in a market
share which he held at a time before the establishment of a common organiza-
tion of a market, since such a market share constitutes only a momentary eco-
nomic position exposed to the risks of changing circumstances.’90
In this case, the rejection of the claim does not lie in the fact that there was no
‘fair balance’ (to use the ECHR terminology), but in the fact that there was no
right to property to the previously existing market share, because this kind of
market share constitutes only a ‘momentary economic position’. This approach
is strongly reminiscent of that of the ECtHR, which in several cases involving
loss of income due to new legislation did not even get round to the fair balance
test because the loss concerned was one of the hazards of economic life and
the right to property was therefore not adversely affected.
Consequently, it is by no means certain, first of all that a right to property
exists in a specific case, and secondly the substantive fair balance test admin-
istered by the ECJ is extremely stringent. Relying on the ‘social function of the
right to property’, the ECJ justifies even very drastic infringements of the right
Wakefield 2002, p. 130-133.87
Case C-588, Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 1989-
2609.
88
See the Opinion of AG Gulmann in Case C -280/93 Germany v. Council [1994], p. I-4973, paras
83 et seq.
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to property. Indeed, it is established case law that the objective pursued by the
EU may justify restrictions that even have substantial adverse consequences for
specific market participants91 – a ground that cannot even be found in the EC-
tHR’s case law on art. 1 FP. For the ECJ, the fact that production restrictions
could adversely affect the profitability of some undertakings and might even
jeopardise their very existence is no reason to assume an infringement of the
right to property.92 In theory, the recognition of the principle of equality could
have changed this very conservative compensation regime, partly because, under
the regime of the equality principle, no weight is given to the general interest
in the decision on whether damage or loss should be borne by the entrepreneur.
In practice, the right to property test shows great similarities to the ‘abnormal
burden’ test. In the context of the right to property, the risk of a restriction on
a market share existing at any time may be relevant to a preliminary question
on whether the right to property exists in a specific case, and in the context of
the principle of equality, that very same question is relevant to the abnormal
burden test.
7 Last Remarks
The liability of the European Union on the basis of Art. 340
TFEU is a multi-faceted and complex matter. It not only involves a comparison
with the laws of different Member States, but also issues concerning legal policy.
After many years of flirting with the recognition of a no-fault liability on the
EU level, the FIAMM decision is in the view of many commentators a disap-
pointment. It is typical however, that the question concerning no-fault liability
came about in the context of the WTO, with its special characteristics and im-
possibility of an action regarding unlawful action by the Community. It therefore
remains to be seen if the FIAMM case was actually apt for answering the fun-
damental question on the existence of no-fault liability within art. 340 TFEU.
In any case, the FIAMM decision implies that companies dealing within the
boundaries of EU law have no possibility of enforcing a right to compensation
when they cannot show that the EU institutions have acted unlawfully. This
means that the right to compensation for damages will probably for a large part
be part of legal policy of the Communities. Where compensation for companies
can in some way help to fulfil the goals of the institutions, sometimes a right
to compensation will be brought about, be it by a special regulation or an indi-
vidual decision. Admittedly, this is a very limited approach of the matter of no-
Case C-331/88 Fedesa [1990], ECR I-4023, para. 17) and Joined Cases C-11/04, C-12/04 en C-
453/03 ABNA [2005] ECR I-10423.
91
Case 172/83 Hoogovensgroep [1985] ECR 1985-2831, para. 23) and Case 258/81 Metallurgiki Halyps
[1982] ECR 1982-4261, para. 13).
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fault state liability, proving that the CJEU is not very open to equity based argu-
ments and underlining the CJEU’s instrumental approach to liability.
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